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1. Introduction
According to the Neoclassical Economics the
economic dynamic is predetermined by tastes, endowments
and technologies. Human actions reveal economic future
but do not create it. I think that such approach can be
treated as “Determinism in Dynamic Economics”. One
of the properties of this approach is neglect of the fact
that the past is irreversible, and the future is uncertain.
The opposite conception – advocated by the Austrian
School – believes that only absolutely subjective decisions
of independent agents form economic future, therefore
any mathematical models of the economic dynamic
are futile. I think that this approach can be treated as
“Voluntarism in Dynamic Economics”. One of the
properties of such approach is neglect of the importance
of resources and institutions (especially, power relations)
for economic development. Both approaches, to my mind,
give perverted, one-sided picture of the dynamic economic
reality.
Is it possible to go beyond dualism between
determinism and voluntarism in dynamic economics? It
is possible to construct more realistic conception of
economic dynamics? I suppose that the students can use
instruments of the Post Keynesian macroeconomics which
is characterized, among other things [1; 8], by two
important features. One of them is the principle of
“originative”, “creative” decision. According to this
principle, economic agents, making decision, “create
history”, that is, determine future situation of the economy.
This feature implies non-deterministic nature of the
economic reality. Another significant feature is the
“shifting equilibrium approach”. This approach means
that each state (position) of the economy is a consequence
of the previous economic position and generates
subsequent economic position. In other words, economic
activity is the process of evolutionary changing of different
economic positions (recovery, boom, recession, etc.).
To be accepted as correct that the “shifting equilibrium
approach” is based on the principle of “creative” decision.
Nevertheless, as I think, there is a contradistinction
between these features or the “paradox of history-creating
decision”. The purposes of my paper are the analysis of
this „paradox”, the attempt to provide solution of that
problem and the ascertainment of other “history-creating”
factors (resources and institutions). I believe that clear
understanding of all sides of human decisions and
“creation of history” is very important in order to study
the macroeconomy in (historical) time and to go beyond
dualism between determinism and voluntarism in dynamic
economics. It is Post Keynesian macroeconomics –
permanently reconsidered and updated – that works in
this direction.
2. The Principle of “Creative” Decision
This principle was implicitly contained in the works
of Keynes [11, Ch. 12; 12] and first explicitly developed
by Shackle (Shackle, 1939, 1966, 1974) whose approach
is a something like a “mix” between Post Keynesian
Economics and Austrian Economics. The point is that
the decisions of economic agents “create history”, in other
words, determine future outcomes in the economy. The
actions of people are not passive consequences of the
previous events. Moreover, typical individual, unlike
Neoclassical approach dogmas, is not “taste-satisfying
machine” [10, p. 218]. People can often form and alter
own purposes and preferences independently. In this way
even the decisions based on the achievement of current
goals (utility, etc.) can be autonomous. Naturally, the
decisions concerned with expectations are autonomous
and independent in a more degree. Moreover, the longer
is period of expectations, the more spontaneity in
the decisions will be. Therefore the most independent,
“uncaused” decisions are long-term fixed capital
investment ones (see below section 5). It is therefore
that in the economics of Keynes and Shackle capital
investment “... was highly capricious, autonomous and
unpredictable. It was a source of the things which
happened to the system, rather than a mere transmitter
of the circular impulses from one part of the system to
another” [24, p. 44].
Such role of the decision in the economics of
Keynes and Shackle is explained by the following reason.
These economists studied economy in historical time,
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that is, in one-directional time. Whilst Neoclassical
economists and (often) Mainstream Keynesians examined
logical or two-directional time. In the historical time the
past is irreversible, the future is uncertain. In other words,
historical time cannot move back, in distinction from
logical time, therefore each decision can in principle create
unique economic position. While in the logical time human
beings can only discover the future, in the historical
time people can create it [see 8, p. 167]. That is why
Shackle criticized dynamic deterministic models of such
Keynesians, as Kaldor, Kalecki, Harrod and Hicks, because
they produced “...a self-contained system, where
everything which happens is explained from within the
system” [24, p. 29].
In such models almost all decisions were fully pre-
determined, as in the contemporary models of the New
Classical economists. And that is why Post Keynesian
economists follow Keynes and Shackle, stressing the
importance of “creative”, “uncaused” human decisions.
3. The “Shifting Equilibrium Approach”
The “shifting equilibrium approach” is fundamental
characteristics of the “historical time economics” (that
is, Post Keynesian economics). The point is that in the
historical time the economy cannot have a tendency
toward certain “state of rest” (“long-run equilibrium”,
“state of tranquility”, “steady-state rate of growth”, etc.).
Because each human decision can influence on the future
outcomes, any economic position can appear only once.
Shifts and changes of different economic states are
imprescriptible features of the “history-creating decisions
economies”. This approach was first invented by Keynes
[11, p. 293]. The essence of it is more clearly explained
by Deprez and Milberg [9, p. 517 – 518]:
“In a historical model... the actual situation of one
period feeds into the next period’s decisions and outcomes,
which feed into those of the next period, and so on. That
is, the economy’s evolution is a cumulative sequence of
short-period situations... In this view of dynamic theory
each sequence depends upon its own history and its own
future and to talk separately of a cycle and a trend is
unacceptable”. It is clearly, that this sentence is confronted
with the Neoclassical approach to the analysis of
economic dynamics.
Therefore any theories describing the tendency of
the economy to the “state of rest” does not reflect the real
world of the “historical time economic systems”. This
statement was most brilliantly proved by Hyman Minsky
in his “financial fragility hypothesis” [17; 18; 26; 27; 19].
In accordance with this conception, when the economy
is in “state of tranquility”, economic agents make
decisions, which „disequilibrate” economic system. In
other words, the firms accomplish highly-leveraged
capital investment; these actions generate boom. Further,
it turns out, that these companies cannot meet the cash
payment commitments that grow out of previously
undertaken financial obligations. This circumstance leads
to economic recession. In other words, in the historical
time, almost any economic position contains in itself seeds
of subsequent positions. All these described ideas are the
common point in Post Keynesian macroeconomics. As I
think, these ideas are not so unambiguous and simple.
4. The “Paradox”
I believe that the principle of “history-creating
decision” contains one internal contradiction concerned
with the “shifting equilibrium approach” (which is, as
I pointed out, inherent to the former feature of Post
Keynesian macroeconomics). I try now to explain the
“paradox” by the following example.
Suppose, that economic agent (or the group of
economic agents) makes decision A in the period 1.
Assume that this decision is absolutely autonomous and
“creative”. It means that, on the one hand, this decision
is independent from the previous and current event, and,
on the other hand, this decision determines future
economic outcomes, for example, outcomes in the
period 2. Then what will happen in the period 2? Economic
situation in this period will be determined by the decision
A, making in the period 1. In other words, actions and
decisions of economic agents in the period 2 will be pre-
determined by the decision A. These actions and decisions
will not be “uncaused” and “creative”: it will be only passive
transmitters of past affairs and events.
Is there the possibility of “uncausedness” and
“creativity” of the decisions making in the period 2? Yes,
but then the decision A will not “create history”; it will be
powerless (in the terminology of Shackle [24, p. 74],
because it will not influence on the actions of agents in
the future (in this example – in the period 2). This example
leads to the following conclusion. Many decisions of
economic agents cannot be fully “uncaused” and “creative”
in any “historical time economy”. Shackle was not right,
when he wrote [24, p. 85]: “If... history is not determinate,
each decision-maker may be conceived to create history
by each of his decisions”.
In other words, the “paradox” consists in the
following. “Uncausedness” and “creativity” of one
decision means inevitably “causedness” and “emptiness”
of another one. “Originativity” of actions of one economic
agent(s) means “passivity” of ones of other agent(s).
The special significance – and all the same “creativity” –
of one economic positions implies that other economic
states are passive (and may be even mechanical) by-
product of the past economic development. In other
words, not all economic positions matter for the
determination of final outcomes. That is why, for
example, the models of “cumulative causation” (circular
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interaction between variables) and “lock-in” (the
dependency of the current behavior of a decision-maker
on his (or her) own actions in the past or on the current
decisions of other agents), which tried to embody the
“shifting equilibrium approach”, were not consistent with
the theories of “creative” decisions. Both types of theories
(on the one hand, “cumulative causation” and “lock-in”
models, on the other hand, “originative” decisions models)
were theories in historical time. But the point is that the
“cumulative causation” and “lock-in” theories contained
deterministic features as distinguished from the “creative”
decisions theories. In connection with it Setterfield [22,
p. 22 – 23] noted:
“The “dynamic determinism” inherent in these
concepts [“cumulative causation” and “lock-in” – I.R.]
means that, apart from the initial conditions (and in the
absence of shocks), no other part of the historical
trajectory of a system exerts an independent influence
on the long-run or final outcome of the system, since
all subsequent points on this trajectory derive in a
deterministic fashion from the initial conditions
themselves”.
5. The Attempts of Dealing with Paradox
In the previous section I came to conclusion, that
not all decisions are absolutely “creative”. It can imply
two things. First, as I pointed out above, some decisions
“create history”, other ones are passive consequences
of the previous events. Second, in principle, each decision
may be partly autonomous and “creative”, and partly
“caused” and “empty”.
On the other hand, if this statement – not all decisions
are absolutely “creative” – is applicable to all economic
events, then no decision can be fully autonomous and
“originative”. I think that such point of view is an extreme
one. There are fully “uncaused” and “creative” decisions;
there are decisions, which are deterministic and “empty”
or “powerless”; there are decisions which contain features
of two preceding kinds of ones. I believe that the last
statement is relevant to the degree of “creativity” of
economic agents, variables and states of the economy [see
also 22, p. 23].
What factors determine the degree of
“uncausedness” and “creativity" of economic decisions?
I suppose that the main factors here are the following:
(a) the time period, during which outcomes of the
decision will be realized; (b) the degree of the irrevocability
of the decision; and (c) the amount of resources provided
by this decision for the realization of other decisions.
The more is time period, the more is the irrevocability,
and the larger is the amount of resources (which is
necessary for the accomplishment of other decisions),
the more spontaneity and “creativity" of the decision will
be. Why? In the first place, the more is given time period,
the less importance of the past and present events will
be. If, for example, the outcomes of the decision will
realize a twenty years later, that making-decision agent
will not take into account current situation. In the second
place, if such “long-term decisions” are one-off, then
the decision-making agent cannot use past or current
data as a statistical basis for this making. In the third
place, these decisions “create history” because it is
making of such ones that determine the degree of
realization of other decisions.
It is clearly that the most autonomous and
“creative” decisions are fixed capital investment ones.
Such decisions are very long-term, does not repeat often
and determine the production possibilities – and, therefore,
income – of the economy. The last feature means that
decisions concerned with the allocation of the production
possibilities, for example, consumption and saving ones,
cannot be “uncaused”, because given possibilities depend
upon exogenous factor – fixed capital investment. The
level of consumption is determined not by the will and
intentions by economic agents, but by income. Income,
in turn, is determined by capital investment. The
Accelerator models of investment and business cycles
are rejected by many Post Keynesians [see, for example,
2, p. 291] because these theories do not recognize
spontaneity of fixed capital investment.
That is why those agents, who make fixed capital
investment decisions, “rule the roost” of the economy [1,
p. 45]. I have in mind the large companies. It is big business
that “create history” by making its decisions, whilst the
role of households is rather more passive (but not always,
as it will be shown below). The same reasoning is applicable
to the economic positions. The state of the economy, in
which massive fixed capital investment (or disinvestment)
decisions are making, is crucial for subsequent economic
evolution. The phase of moderate expansion determines
significantly the following phase of boom. As well as the
“dying down” of the investment activity in the phase of
slump determines the deepness of subsequent depression.
In other words, the most important (more exactly,
“originative”) “points” during the business cycle are the
initial phases of expansion and recession. In the former
points the actions of firms determine when the economy
ceases to be in the depression and what the prosperity will
be. In the latter points the actions of firms determine when
the boom ends up and how the economy will sink in the
gulf of collapse.
These deductions are one of the most important
ones in this paper and complement the conclusions
derived by Setterfield [22, p. 23] which asserted that not
all events can be important: “... “mild” historical events
may not really matter in the sense of their not having an
influence on long-run or final outcomes”.
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“Non-mild” events (massive fixed capital investment
or disinvestment, and also, perhaps, successful
“investments” in technologies and institutions), on the
contrary, do the influence on the final outcomes. In other
words, the “selective history” takes place [3, 22]. It is
also clearly, for example, why many financial investment
decisions are not so “originative” and “creative”. These
decisions are not always long-term and one-off.
Moreover, such decisions do not often form resources
which necessary for the realization of other decisions.
Nevertheless, some financial investment decisions are
extremely important in the historical, “creative” sense...
6. The “Objective Restrictors” and Institutions
The above reasoning led to the conclusion that the
absolutely “uncaused” and “creative” decisions can
however take place. Such decisions are fixed capital
investment ones. But this deduction is true only if two
important conditions hold: if there is the absence of the
“objective restrictors” of investment and if the social
institutions do not change quickly.
The former condition means sufficient amount of
the physical and especially financial resources, which
are necessary for investing. The access to the physical
resources is not very serious problem, because the
“monetary production economy” – a Post Keynesian
„nickname” of the capitalism [1; 19] – is rarely reaches
the full employment position. The access to the financial
resources problem is rather more crucial. The lack of
liquidity can stop economic growth if even economic
agents are bullish and ready to invest in the stock capital.
Such lack can be treated as a special kind of the “liquidity
trap” (Davidson, 1965, p. 62; 1968; 1969) and is a
consequence of (mostly) high level of and/or increase in
the liquidity preference. High liquidity preference (which
can be often “uncaused”) can force agents not to invest
in profitable but risky financial assets (for example,
obligations of highly-leveraged business firms) and then
some capital investment will not occur. It is in these
circumstances that financial investment decisions can be
“creative”! Therefore not only companies, but also banks
[1, p. 45] and wealthy households can influence on the
history of the economy in calendar time. Keynes [13,
p. 668) asserted: “The banks hold the key position in the
transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity”.
I think also that the large capital disinvestment in
the beginning of a slump are not the passive pre-determined
consequences of past events, but are often generated
by extreme liquidity shortage, that is, by absence of
necessary resources.
The second condition can be violated if there are
rapid changes in the taxation, political, distributional and/
or property rights systems. Capital investment decisions
cannot be “uncaused” if, for example, taxes’ rates rise
or massive nationalization takes place. Spontaneity and
“originativeness” of investment decisions are possible
only under a more or less stable institutional structure.
For example, investment collapse in the CIS countries
(including Russia) in the 1990-s was a consequence of
not so “originative decisions” of economic agents as
adverse institutional changes and circumstances (political
disintegration, too quick privatization, increase in the
taxes, destruction of formal institutions due to rapid
institutional transformation [20, p. 38]  and so on).
7. Summary and Conclusions
The statements about the absolute spontaneity and
“creativity” of all human decisions in the economy
moving in (historical) time – in the „monetary production
economy” – are in a more degree not true. There are
some reasons for this conclusion.
First, absolute “uncausedness” and “creativity” of
one decision means automatically deterministic nature of
other decisions. “Creation of history” means that “created”
historical events (and, therefore, human decisions and
actions) are not spontaneous and “originative”.
Second, those decisions which are independent from
the past and present decisions and acts (because such
ones are long-term and one-off), cannot be realized when
the necessary resources are absent. For example, capital
investment with long period gestation cannot be occur if
there is a lack of finances, which are necessary for
providing this transaction.
Third, human decisions cannot be fully autonomous
and “creative” when the social institutions (taxes, property
rights, political system) change rapidly. Such changes
do not permit to “look into the (far) future” (by imagination)
and, therefore, realistically to ground these decisions. This
sentence is touched upon the problem of “investor
myopia” [21].
Such, only some (long-term and one-off) human
decisions can be “uncaused” and “creative”, but it is
possible, when there are no the lack of physical and
financial resources (that is, “objective restrictors” are
absent) and when changes in the institutional structure
of the society do not occur. On the other hand, it should
be kept in sight that the amount of some resources and
the institutions can be itself are the outcomes of the human
decisions (for example, investment decisions determine
the production possibilities – see section 5 – and so on).
However, these sentences do not mean recognition
of the determinism in the economics. Really, the economy
is not mechanism, and the economics is not creation of
mechanical analogues of the economy, as Mainstream
economists prove [see, for example, 16, p. 281]. The
essential investment decisions create new future and make
the macroeconomy devoid of determinism. But the moving
forces of the economy in historical time are not only the
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will and spontaneous, capricious affairs of economic
agents, as Austrian School economists think (and as
Shackle believed). Yes, of course, in historical time the
situation is impossible, when „the motion of the economy
from state to state is independent of decisions made by
individuals in the economy” [16, p. 69]. Historical time
makes determinism impossible. But there are „parameters”
which also do the influence on this motion: the availability
of necessary – physical and financial – resources and
the social institutions. I can agree here with Lawson [14,
p. 920), who wrote:
“Individual actions and social practices each
presuppose each other” [see also 15; 4].
In other words, resources, institutions and human
decisions together determine the motion of the economy
in historical time. As I think, Shackle overestimated the
role of “originative” decisions and underestimated the
importance of the “objective restrictors” and institutional
environment. Besides that he (together with Austrian School
economists) did not take into account the “paradox of
history-creating decision”. As a result, the theories of
Austrians and Shackle did not describe economic processes
of the real world and did not contribute to the solution of
the problems of this world (in distinction from, for
example, theories of Keynes and Minsky).
Broadly speaking, the main conclusion here for Post
Keynesian macroeconomics is the following. If the
students do not take into account the social institutions
and the availability of resources and do not see the
“paradox of history-creating decision”, that they cannot
understand macro-relationships in the “historical time
economy”. The situation when any human decision can
“create history” is impossible, because such “creation”
means pre-determined nature of “created” all events, acts
and decisions. The recognition of importance of the
historical time and the refusal from building of the
mechanical models should not lead to the overestimation
of the human decisions “creativity”. It is the only way to
go beyond dualism between determinism and voluntarism
in the analysis of economic dynamics and to understand
how to take into account in economic analysis both
“creative” character of human decisions and the binding
role of resources and institutions.
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Розмаїнський І. В. За межами детермінізму
і волюнтаризму в динамічній економічній тео-
рії, або Hарис про „парадокс рішення, що ство-
рює історію”
Стаття містить спробу виходу за межі дуалізму
між детермінізмом і волюнтаризмом в динамічній еко-
номічній теорії. З одного боку, економічна динаміка
не зумовлена смаками, початковими запасами ре-
сурсів і технологіями (як учить неокласична школа).
З іншого боку, економічна динаміка не є наслідком
абсолютно суб’єктивних і спонтанних зусиль індивідів
(як учить австрійська школа). Щоб вирішити постав-
лену задачу, автор застосовує посткейнсіанський під-
хід до аналізу економічної динаміки і акцентує важ-
ливість таких концепцій, як принцип креативного рі-
шення і принцип рухомої рівноваги. Він формулює і
досліджує „парадокс рішення, що створює історію”.
Цей парадокс полягає в тому, що автономність і креа-
тивність якогось одного рішення неминуче означає при-
чинну зумовленість і відсутність впливовості якогось
іншого рішення. Різні рішення характеризуються різни-
ми ступенями автономності і креативності. У статті
формулюються критерії, що впливають на це.
Ключові слова: детермінізм в економічній науці,
волюнтаризм в економічній науці, посткейнсианская
економічна теорія, історичний час, креативное рішен-
ня, рухома рівновага, парадокс рішення, що створює
історію.
Розмаинский И. В. За пределами детерми-
низма и волюнтаризма в динамической экономи-
ческой теории, или Очерк о „парадоксе решения,
создающего историю”
Статья содержит попытку выхода за пределы ду-
ализма между детерминизмом и волюнтаризмом в
динамической экономической теории. С одной сторо-
ны, экономическая динамика не предопределена вку-
сами, исходными запасами ресурсов и технологиями
(как учит неоклассическая школа). С другой сторо-
ны, экономическая динамика не является последствием
абсолютно субъективных и спонтанных усилий инди-
видов (как учит австрийская школа). Чтобы решить
поставленную задачу, автор применяет посткейнсиан-
ский подход к анализу экономической динамики и
акцентирует важность таких концепциях как принцип
креативного решения и принцип подвижного равно-
весия. Он формулирует и исследует „парадокс реше-
ния, создающего историю”. Этот парадокс состоит в
том, что автономность и креативность какого-то одного
решения неизбежно означает причинную обусловлен-
ность и отсутствие влиятельности какого-то другого
решения. Разные решения характеризуются разными
степенями автономности и креативности. В статье фор-
мулируются критерии, влияющие на это.
Ключевые слова: детерминизм в экономической
науке, волюнтаризм в экономической науке, посткейн-
сианская экономическая теория, историческое время,
креативное решение, подвижное равновесие, парадокс
решения, создающего историю.
Rozmainsky I. V. Beyond Dualism Between
Determinism and Voluntarism in Dynamic Economics,
or Essay on the “Paradox of History-creating Decision”
The paper contains attempt to go beyond dualism
between determinism and voluntarism in dynamic
economics. On one hand, economic dynamics is not
predetermined by tastes, endowments and technologies
(as Neoclassical Economics teaches). On the other hand,
economic dynamics is not a consequence of absolutely
subjective and spontaneous affairs of individuals (as
Austrian Economics teaches). In order to solve the
problem author applies Post Keynesian approach to the
analysis of economic dynamics and emphasizes such
conceptions as the principle of “creative” decision and
the principle of shifting equilibrium. He formulates and
explores the “paradox of history-creating decision”. This
paradox is the fact that “uncausedness” and “creativity”
of one decision means inevitably “causedness” and
“emptiness” of another one. All human decisions cannot
be autonomous “creative”. The different decisions are
characterized by the different degrees of “originativeness”
and “creativeness”. The paper formulates criteria which
influence on it.
Key words: determinism in economics, voluntarism
in economics, post keynesian economics, historical time,
creative decision, shifting equilibrium, paradox of history-
creating decision.
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